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THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY: 
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE REFORM 
KATHRYN L. MOORE* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 12, 2008, the nation's first Baby Boomer, 
Kathleen Casey-Kirschling, was the first of her generation to 
receive a Social Security retirement benefit.l Born one second 
after midnight on January 1, 1946,2 Ms. Casey-Kirschling was 
born just eleven years after the Social Security system was 
originally enacted,3 nine years after the first Social Security 
payroll taxes were collected,4 and six years after the system first 
began to pay monthly retirement benefits.5 
"As the nation's first Baby Boomer, Ms. Casey-Kirschling is 
leading what is often referred to as America's silver tsunami. 6 
Over the next two decades, nearly eighty million Americans will 
become eligible for Social Security retirement benefits, more than 
10,000 per day on average."7 
* Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky 
College of Law. I would like to thank Nancy J. Altman for her comments on 
an earlier draft of this Article. 
1. Soc. Sec. Admin. Press Release, Nation's First Baby Boomer Receives 
Her First Soc. Sec. Retirement Benefit, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
pressoffice/prlbabyboomer-firstcheck-pr.htm [hereinafter SSA Press Release] 
(last visited Jul. 13, 2008). 
2. Id. 
3. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Social 
Security Act]. 
4. See 1935 Social Security Act §§ 801, 804 (levying tax on employees and 
employers beginning in 1937). 
5. Under the original Social Security Act, the payment of retirement 
benefits was scheduled to commence in 1942. 1935 Social Security Act 
§ 202(a). The 1939 Amendments accelerated the commencement date to 1940. 
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. 76·379, § 202(a) (1939). On 
January 31, 1940, Ida Mae Fuller, the first beneficiary of monthly Social 
Security benefits, received her first check of $22.54. The First Social Security 
Beneficiary, History Page: Brief History, http://www.ssa.govihistory/imf.html 
(last checked Jul. 13, 2008). Living until age 100, Miss Fuller received over 
$20,000 in Social Security retirement benefits. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TO 
STRENGTHEN SOCIAL SECURITY, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS 5 (Dec. 21, 2001) 
[hereinafter 2001 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT]. 
6. SSA Press Release, supra note l. 
7. Id. 
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Due to the arrival of this silver tsunami, the Social Security 
system's costs are rapidly accelerating.8 In addition, the Social 
Security system faces a long-term deficit.9 Accordingly, 
lawmakers and commentators have offered a multitude of 
proposals to reform the Social Security system. The proposals 
range from those that would fundamentally restructure the system 
by directing some Social Security contributions to individual 
accounts, to those that would retain the system's current structure 
but make incremental changes, such as increasing the taxable 
wage base and/or increasing the normal retirement age. 
Just as the proposals for reform vary widely, their impact on 
the structure of the Social Security system as well as on individual 
beneficiaries vary widely. This Article discusses the principles 
that should guide reform of the Social Security system. Part II 
describes the fundamental principles that underlie the current 
system. Part III then turns to the principles that should guide 
reform. 
II. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CURRENT 
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
Enacted at the height of the Great Depression,lO Social 
Security is arguably the most successful program of the modern 
welfare state.l1 In signing the Social Security Act on August 14, 
8. Although the arrival of the silver tsunami will cause Social Security's 
costs to rapidly increase, it has almost nothing to do with why the Social 
Security system currently faces a long-term deficit. Instead, the current 
deficit results "from an accumulation of relatively small annual changes in the 
actuarial assumptions and in the method of making the estimates." REPORT 
OF THE 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, VOL. I: FINDING 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Appendix I, at 163, available at http://www.ssa.gov/ 
history/reports/adcouncillreportltoc.htm [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL 
REPORT]. See also PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL 
SECURITY 58 (2004) (isolating three important factors underlying Social 
Security's deficit: (1) increasing life expectancy; (2) increases in earnings 
inequality; and (3) the fact that Social Security, like most social insurance 
systems, paid the first generation of retirees far more than their contributions 
to the system could finance). 
9. See infra Section lIB (describing Social Security's long-term deficit and 
advocating reform that addresses that deficit). 
10. PHILIP BOOTH, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 7 (1973). Scholars believe 
that: 
[d. 
"There is little doubt that the act would not have been adopted in 1935 
except for acute public awareness of widespread deprivation, 
dependency, and hopelessness during the Great Depression that 
convinced the people and their representatives in Congress that 
government action was essential to relieve the human distress caused 
by unemployment, old-age dependency, insecurity, and widespread 
poverty." 
11. See Kenneth S. Apfel, Strengthening Social Security for the New 
2008] The Future of Social Security: Principles to Guide Reform 1063 
1935, President Franklin Roosevelt declared: 
We can never insure one hundred percent of the population against 
one hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we 
have tried to frame a law which will give some measure of protection 
to the average citizen and to his family against the loss of a job and 
against poverty-ridden old age,12 
When the Social Security system was originally enacted, it 
provided for two general types of benefits: (1) monthly old-age 
benefits for retirees I3 and (2) lump-sum death benefits for 
workers.14 Four years later, Congress fundamentally transformed 
the system by replacing the lump-sum death benefits for workers 
with two new categories of benefits: (1) benefits for the wife and 
minor children of retired workers,15 and (2) benefits for widows, 
surviving dependent children, and surviving dependent parents. 16 
The Social Security system has evolved considerably in the years 
since 1939, but its basic structure has remained intact. 
A. Robert Ball's Nine Guiding Principles 
Just as there is not universal agreement on the way in which 
Social Security should be reformed, there is not universal 
agreement on the exact principles which underlie the current 
system either. For example, a 1991 article published in the Social 
Security Bulletin identified five principles that "have been 
adhered to throughout the development of the [Social Security] 
program:" (1) work related; (2) no means test; (3) contributory; (4) 
universal compulsory coverage; and (5) rights defined in the law. 17 
Millennium, Presented at the Berlin Conference on Pension Reform and Labor 
Markets 9 (May 21, 2001) CIt is not hyperbole to say that in the United States 
the Social Security system is the most successful and widely supported 
domestic program in the nation's history."); see also Jeffrey R. Brown, et aI., 
Top Ten Myths of Social Security Reform, 13 ELDER L.J. 309, 310 (2006) ("The 
U.S. Social Security system has been one of the most successful public policy 
programs in our nation's history"); LARRY E. DEWI'ITE, DANIEL BELAND, AND 
EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL SECURITY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1 (2008) 
("In size and scope, the Social Security program is the most expansive and 
important social welfare program in the United States."). 
12. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Statement Signing the 
Social Security Act, August 14, 1935, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION OF THE 
REPORT OF THE COMMI'ITEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER 
BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ACT 145 (1985) [hereinafter 50TH ANNIVERSARY ED.]. 
13. 1935 Social Security Act § 202. 
14. 1935 Social Security Act § 203. 
15. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. 76-379, §§ 202(b)-(c). 
16. Social Security Amendments of 1939, § 202(c), (d), (e), (t). 
17. David Schwartz et aI., Social Security Programs in the United States, 54 
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Sept. 1991, 9, 9-10. The Social Security Reform 
Center offers a similar list of four basic principles underlying the current 
Social Security system: (1) the system is work related; (2) benefits are not 
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A book published in 1973 identified three similar, but obviously 
not identical, basic principles on which the Social Security system 
was founded: (1) a national (not state-by-state) system; (2) 
compulsory for those in covered employment; and (3) providing 
benefits as a matter of right (without regard to individual means 
or needs)."18 
This Section will discuss the "nine guiding principles of the 
Social Security system" identified by the late Robert Ball, 
Commissioner of Social Security under Presidents Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Nixon, and a staunch supporter of the current Social 
Security system,19 Of course, this list is not free from criticism. 
For example, one might argue that some of the principles overlap 
too much to constitute separate principles. In addition, one might 
argue that because some of the principles, such as wage indexing 
and inflation protection, were not part of the original Social 
Security Act,20 they are not fundamental guiding principles.21 
Nevertheless, this section will discuss these "nine guiding 
principles" because they fairly represent the principles underlying 
the current system and help provide a clear understanding of the 
current system. 
means tested; (3) universal compulsory coverage; and (4) benefits are defined 
by law. Social Security Reform Center, The System Today, 
http://www.socialsecurityreform.orglhistoryltoday.cfm. See also MARTHA 
DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 21 (1979) (identifying the 
Social Security program's "first principles" as follows: "It should be 
contributory: people must qualify for benefits by making contributions (paying 
taxes). Having paid their contributions, they or their dependents should get 
benefits as a matter of right. There must be no means test, which is to say no 
need to prove need, Benefits should be related to wages. The program should 
be national in scope and should be run by the federal government. It should 
beuniversal and compulsory.") 
18. BOOTH, supra note 10, at 10. 
19. ROBERT M. BALL, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS: BOB BALL ON SOCIAL 
SECURITY: A SELECTION OF ARTICLES AND ESSAYS FROM 1942 THROUGH 2000, 
5-10 (Thomas N. Bethell ed. 2000) [hereinafter INSURING THE ESSENTIALS]. 
20. The indexing provisions were added in 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-336, 86 
Stat. 406, § 202 (1972). 
21. Prior to the institution of the indexing provisions in 1972, Congress did, 
however, periodically increase benefits and the taxable wage base. See 2008 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND 
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST 132 
tbl.VI.Al. (showing that taxable wage base was increased six times between 
1937 and 1972) [hereinafter 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT]. 
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1. Universal, or Nearly Universal, Coverage
President Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security, which
was charged with drafting the original Social Security bill,
recommended that the Social Security system "include, on a
compulsory basis, all manual workers and nonmanual workers
earning less than $250 per month,22 except those of governmental
units and those covered by the United States Railroad Retirement
Act."23 Coverage under the original Social Security Act was more
limited 24 in that it only covered employees in nonagricultural
industry and commerce, or about fifty-six percent of the country's
labor force. 25 Over the years, however, coverage has expanded so
as to achieve the Committee on Economic Security's original vision
of nearly universal coverage. 26 Indeed, the Social Security system
today covers about ninety-six percent of the American workforce,
27
with an estimated 163 million people contributing payroll taxes in
2007.28 In addition, almost fifty million people were receiving
Social Security benefits at the end of 2007,29 including more than
22. Presumably, the Committee excluded workers earning more than $250
per month, high wage workers at the time, because the Committee was
focused on alleviating poverty and was not concerned about high wage
workers. Debra Whitman, Social Security: Raising or Eliminating the Taxable
Earnings Base, 2005 Congressional Research Service 1.
23. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 29, in 50TH
ANNIVERSARY ED., supra note 12, at 49.
24. It was also more expansive in that rather than excluding highly paid
workers, it covered the wages of the highly paid up to a maximum taxable
wage base of $3,000 (or $250 per month). Social Security Act, ch. 531, Sec.
811(a), 49 Stat. 620, 639 (1935). Debra Whitman of the Congressional
Research Service has speculated that the high wage exemption was replaced
with a taxable wage base to promote administrative ease and tax equity.
Whitman, supra note 22, at 2.
25. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 5.
26. Indeed, the coverage under the current system exceeds the vision of the
Committee on Economic Security because it covers the self-employed as well
as the wages of the highly paid up to a maximum taxable wage base. Cf.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 29, in 50TH
ANNIVERSARY ED., supra note 12, at 49 (recommending coverage for employees
earning up to $250 per week; no mention of coverage for the self-employed).
27. The excluded workers fall into five categories: (1) civilian federal
workers who were hired before January 1, 1984; (2) railroad workers who are
covered under the railroad retirement system; (3) certain state and local
governmental employees; (4) domestic and farm workers whose earnings are
below a minimum amount; and (5) individuals with very low net earnings from
self-employment. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2007, 12 [hereinafter 2007
SSA STAT. SUPP.].
28. Id.
29. The beneficiaries consisted of thirty-four million retired workers and
their dependents, six million survivors of deceased workers, and nine million
disabled workers and their dependents. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT,
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ninety percent of the population age sixty-five and older. 30
2. Earned Right
Robert Ball described the second principle, "earned right," as
follows:
Social Security is more than a statutory right; it is an earned right,
with eligibility for benefits and the benefit rate based on an
individual's past earnings. This principle sharply distinguishes
Social Security from welfare and links the program, appropriately,
to other earned rights such as wages, fringe benefits, and private
pensions.
3 1
Social Security's characterization as an earned right arises
from the fact that it is financed principally through payroll taxes.
In recommending that Social Security be financed through payroll
taxes, the Committee on Economic Security explained,
"[c]ontributory annuities are unquestionably preferable to
noncontributory pensions. They come to the workers as a right,
whereas the noncontributory pensions [that is, welfare] must be
conditioned upon a 'means' test."
32
3. Wage Related
The current Social Security system is a defined benefit
program in which benefits are based on past wages. Specifically,
retirement benefits for everyone born after 1928 and retiring in
1991 or later are based on thirty-five years of earnings, which are
indexed to increases in the average national wage. 33 Average
adjusted earnings, or "average indexed monthly earnings"
("AIME"), are then calculated by taking the best thirty-five years
of earnings and dividing by 420 (the number of months in thirty-
five years). 34 Average adjusted earnings are then plugged into a
progressive benefit formula to determine the "primary insurance
amount" (PIA), or how much of earnings should be replaced.35 For
those reaching sixty-two in 2008, the formula replaces ninety
percent of the first $711 of AIME, plus thirty-two percent of AIME
between $711 and $4,288, plus fifteen percent of AIME above
$4,288.36
supra note 21, at 2.
30. 2007 SSA STAT. SUPP., supra note 27, at 3.18 tbl.3.E6 (based on 2005
data).
31. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 6.
32. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 25, in 50TH
ANNIVERSARY ED., supra note 12, at 45.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (2006).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1) (2006).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2006).
36. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 104 fig.V.C1.
1066 [41:1061
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The fact that benefits are related to wages reinforces the
concept that benefits are an earned right and recognizes "that
there is a relationship between one's standard of living while
working and the benefit level needed to achieve income security in
retirement."37 Moreover, basing benefits on past wages promotes
"individual equity," one of the fundamental goals of Social
Security.
38
4. Contributory and Self-Financed
The current Social Security system is financed principally
through dedicated payroll taxes. 39 In 2007, net payroll taxes
accounted for eight-four percent of the Social Security Trust
Fund's income.40 Interest on the Trust Fund's surplus accounted
for fourteen percent of the Trust Fund's income, and revenue from
the federal income tax imposed on certain Social Security benefits
accounted for two percent of the Trust Fund's income.41
Financing Social Security principally through payroll taxes
reinforces the concept of benefits as an earned right4 2 and "gives
contributors a moral claim on future benefits above and beyond
statutory obligations."43 As President Roosevelt explained:
Those taxes were never a problem of economics. They are politics all
the way through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to
give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect
their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes
in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security
37. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 7.
38. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-193SP,
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS, 3 (May 2005)
[hereinafter GAO ANSWERS] ("[A]nother goal of the program is to ensure that
benefits bear some relationship to contributions. This goal is known as
individual equity.").
39. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a), 3101(a), 3111(a) (2008). This Article uses the
term payroll taxes, rather than contributions under the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act, because it is the term that is commonly used. Nancy
Altman contends that the term "payroll taxes" is a misnomer in two respects.
First, workers do not have payrolls; only employers do. More importantly, the
deductions are better understood as mandatory premiums or contributions,
rather than mere taxes. Altman believes that it is instructive to note that the
acronym for the Social Security payment is "FICA," which stands for "Federal
Insurance Contributions Act," enacted in 1939, well before the days of paid
public relations consultants and spin doctors. Nancy J. Altman, Social
Security and the Low Income Worker, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2007). Id.
40. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
41. Id.
42. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: A PRIMER 14
(Sept. 2001) ("One purpose of using payroll taxes rather than income taxes or
other sources of revenue was so that elderly beneficiaries would feel they had
earned their benefits, whether or not they had really done so.").
43. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 7.
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program.
4 4
In addition, this method of financing has a couple of other
advantages. First, it protects the program from having to compete
against other programs in the annual general federal budget.
45
Second, it imposes fiscal discipline that protects the program from
excessive liberalization because participants (and employers) know





Social Security's progressive benefit formula is redistributive
in that it replaces a higher percentage of the earnings of lower-
wage workers than that of higher-wage workers. Specifically, for
workers retiring at age sixty-five in 2008, Social Security replaces
52.6% of the earnings of a low-income worker, 39.0% of the
earnings of an average wage earner, and 32.4% of the earnings of a
high-wage worker. 48 The progressive nature of the formula is
designed to further another one of Social Security's fundamental
goals, ensuring adequate retirement income, 49 often referred to as
44. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 308-09
(1958).
45. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 7. Cf. ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 8, at 18 ("The method of financing Social Security entirely
by dedicated taxes has given the system considerable protection from having
to compete against other programs in the general budget.").
46. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 7-8. See also Schwartz et
al., supra note 17, at 9 ("The contributory nature of the program encourages a
responsible attitude toward it. Workers have a "vested interest in the
soundness of the program," because they know financing of the system
depends on the taxes they pay.) See also ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra
note 8, at 18 ("The fiscal discipline in Social Security arises from the need to
ensure that income earmarked for Social Security is sufficient to meet the
entire cost of the program, both in the short run and long run, rather than
from competition with other programs in the general budget.").
47. Not all elements of the Social Security system are progressive. For
example, Social Security imposes a flat tax on earnings up to the maximum
taxable wage base and no payroll tax on earnings above the taxable wage
base. Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security
System, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 955, 983-84 (2000). Critics of the current system
point to the regressive nature of the tax and contend that it does not
effectively redistribute income to the lower paid. See generally id. (discussing
in detail the ways in which Social Security redistributes income).
48. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 193 tbl.VI.F10.
Because the normal retirement age is scheduled to gradually increase to age
sixty-seven by 2022, replacement rates will continue to fall for workers who
elect to retire at age sixty-five rather than the higher normal retirement age.
Id. at 191-93.
49. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 8. See also GAO ANSWERS,
supra note 38, at 3 ("Helping ensure adequate retirement income is a
fundamental goal of Social Security, While Social Security was never intended
to guarantee an adequate income by itself, it provides an income upon which
1068 [41:1061
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"social adequacy."
6. Not means tested
Social Security benefits are not subject to a means test. This
feature distinguishes Social Security, a social insurance program,
from welfare. 50 Welfare, by definition, provides benefits based on
need.51  Social Security, in contrast, is an earned right;
"benefits... are paid regardless of income from savings, pensions,
private insurance, and other forms of nonwork income."
52
The absence of a means test helps Social Security fulfill its
role of providing "a floor of protection on which private-sector
economic security measures can be built."53 Social Security alone
was never meant to guarantee an adequate income. 54 Rather, our
national retirement income security system is frequently referred
to as a "three-legged stool,"5 5 with Social Security representing one
of the legs and employer-sponsored pension plans and individual
savings representing the other two legs.56 Unlike welfare, Social
to build .... The benefit formula seeks to ensure adequacy by providing
somewhat higher benefits, relative to wages, for lower-income workers than
higher-income workers.")
50. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 8. See also
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 14 (Social Security's
developers "were eager that Social Security not been seen as a welfare
program but rather as a 'self-respecting method through which workers make
their own provision for old age."').
51. See NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 32 (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2005) ("Welfare, by definition, provides a benefit based on
need").
52. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 9.
53. ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 231 (4th ed. 1993).
54. GAO ANSWERS, supra note 38, at 3. See also DIAMOND & ORSZAG,
supra note 8, at 15 ("Social Security benefits were never intended to be
sufficient to provide a comfortable retirement by themselves. Rather, they are
meant to be a safe income foundation after retirement or disability.").
55. See Nancy J. Altman, Protecting Social Security's Beneficiaries:
Achieving Balance Without Benefit Cuts, 2007 Economic Policy Institute
Briefing Paper No. 206, at 13 (crediting Reinhard A. Hohaus, vice president
and chief actuary of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, with the first
use of the three-legged stool analogy). Sometimes analysts include
Supplement Security Income in the mix and refer to our retirement income
system as a four tiered program. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note
8, at 15 ("The Social Security system is part of a four-tier system of retirement
income arrangements in which each tier is important and complementary to
the others: Social Security; (2) employer-sponsored pensions; (3) individual
savings; and (4) a safety net program, called Supplemental Security Income
(SSI)").
56. Christopher Bone, An Actuarial Perspective on How Social Security
Reform Could Influence Employer-Sponsored Pensions, in PROSPECTS FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 333, 333 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al., eds., 1999) ("The
U.S. retirement income system has often been described as a three-legged
stool, with the three supports being social security, employer-sponsored
retirement plans, and individual savings.").
1069
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Security encourages savings by providing workers with a base
upon which to build additional income protection.
57
7. Wage Indexed
Social Security is wage indexed. Specifically, when benefits
are initially calculated, workers' earnings are indexed by
multiplying each year's wages by an indexing factor equal to the
ratio of the average national wage in the year the worker turns
sixty5 8 to the average national wage in the year to be indexed. 59 In
addition, the dollar amounts, or "bend points" to which the
progressive benefit formula is applied, are increased by the rate of
the growth of the national average wage. 60  This method of
calculating initial benefits ensures that benefits for each
generation of workers grow at the same rate as their wages grow,
and the replacement rate, that is, initial benefits as a percentage
of workers' career-average earnings, remains constant.61
"[W]ithout this principle, Social Security would soon provide




Once initial benefits are calculated, they are adjusted for
increases in the consumer price index. 63 Price indexing ensures
that initial benefits do not decline in value as prices increase over
time and that retirees' buying power remains the same.64 This
inflation protection distinguishes Social Security from private and
57. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8, at 18. According to Nancy
Altman:
Prior to the enactment of Social Security, most people saw retirement on
an adequate income as an impossible goal. With the promise of Social
Security, it became a realistic goal. At the same time, most people saw
that the promised benefits were inadequate, if they wanted to maintain
their standards of living in retirement. Consequently, they began to
think about methods to supplement the promise.
ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 96.
58. For administrative ease, wages earned at age sixty or later are left at
their nominal value in the indexing process. See Memorandum from Patrick
Purcell, Specialist in Soc. Legislation, Cong. Research Serv., to Senate Finance
Comm., "Progressive Price Indexing' of Soc. Sec. Benefits CRS-2 n.4 (Apr. 22,
2005), http://www.tcf.org/Publications/RetirementSecurity/CRS-Price_
Indexing_04-22-05.pdf (last visited Jul. 13, 2008).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (2006); Purcell, supra note 58, at CRS-2.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A) (2006); Purcell, supra note 58, at CRS-3.
61. Purcell, supra note 58, at CRS-4-5.
62. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 8-9.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (2006); INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at
9.
64. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 9.
1070 [41:1061
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state and local government pension plans. 65
9. Compulsory
Participation in the Social Security system is not voluntary.
Rather, all covered workers are required to contribute to the
system.66 The compulsory nature of the program eliminates the
risk of adverse selection, that is, the problem of "individuals
deciding when and to what extent they want to participate,
depending on whether their individual circumstances seem
favorable." 67 In addition, the compulsory, nearly universal nature
of the system helps stabilize the cost of the system and "assures
virtually everyone in society a base of economic security."
68
B. Final Thoughts on the Principles Underlying the Current
Social Security System
As noted above, there is considerable overlap among some of
Social Security's "nine guiding principles." For example, the
earned right characterization of Social Security benefits arises
from the fact that it is financed principally through payroll taxes
and is reinforced by the absence of a means test and the fact that
benefits are related to past wages.
In addition, a couple of the principles may be viewed as
fundamentally contradictory. Specifically, the redistributive
element, which promotes social adequacy, may be seen as
contradicting the wage-related element, which promotes
individual equity. Indeed, critics of the current system contend
that this "inherent conflict" makes the system unworkable.
6 9
65. Id. See also ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8, at 17 ('Most
state and local plans offer only partial protection against inflation, and private
pension plans usually do not offer automatically adjustments, although they
may provide ad hoc benefit increases to recipients from time to time").
66. INSURING THE ESSENTIALS, supra note 19, at 9.
67. Id.
68. Schwartz et al., supra note 17, at 9.
69. See June E. O'Neill, Why Social Security Needs Fundamental Reform,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 90 (2004) ("Thus, from its early days, Social Security had
a muddled mission."); STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
105TH CONGRESS, 1998 GREENBOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS 97-98 (Comm. Print 1998) ("Critics of Social Security argue that by
combining the goals of social adequacy, which is welfare-related, with
individual equity, which loosely ties benefits to taxes paid, the program has
becomes a mishmash that accomplishes neither goal well and creates
inequities"); see also Lewis B. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of
Social Security: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5-FALL KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
9, 13 (1995) ("The system attempts to provide two fundamentally different
services--social insurance and welfare--and succeeds at neither"); see also
PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 3-7
(1980) (arguing that the inherent conflict in adequacy and equity is the source
1071
The John Marshall Law Review
Proponents of the current system, on the other hand, laud the
balancing of individual equity and social adequacy as one of the
system's fundamental strengths.
70
In any event, these nine guiding principles illustrate the
complexity of the current Social Security system. In addition, they
show that, at its core, the current system is a system of social
insurance whose essential purpose "is to prevent hardship,
poverty, or dependence that might be caused by the contingencies
covered wherever and whenever these might occur among workers
able to join their employers and the government in a national
program."71 Solidarity, rather than individual responsibility, lies
at the heart of the current Social Security system.
III. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE REFORM
Not surprisingly, there is not universal agreement on the
principles that should guide reform of the Social Security system.
Indeed, there is almost as much diversity in the principles as there
is in the types of reforms proposed.
For example, President Bush charged his 2001 Commission to
Strengthen Social Security with making recommendations to
reform Social Security using six guiding principles: (1)
modernization must not change Social Security benefits for
retirees or near-retirees; (2) the entire Social Security surplus
must be dedicated only to Social Security; (3) Social Security
payroll taxes must not be increased; (4) the government must not
invest Social Security funds in the stock market; (5) modernization
must preserve Social Security's disability and survivors insurance
programs; and (6) modernization must include individually
controlled, voluntary personal retirement accounts which will
augment Social Security. 72  Congressman Earl Pomeroy, in
contrast, offered the following four principles to guide reform: (1)
preserve Social Security's guaranteed benefit; (2) work to fix
Social Security, not overhaul it; (3) strengthen Social Security
without massive borrowing; and (4) save Social Security for future
generations.
73
of all of the program's major defects).
70. See, e.g., Theodore R. Marmor and Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding
Social Insurance: Fairness, Affordability, And The 'Modernization' Of Social
Security And Medicare, 15 ELDER L.J. 123, 130 (2007) (contending that Social
Security successfully blends "these two different visions of fairness"); see also
WILBUR J. COHEN & MILTON FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: UNIVERSAL OR
SELECTIVE? 68 (1972) (Cohen asserts that the balancing of individual equity
and social adequacy is the art that has made the system acceptable).
71. J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 57-58 (1977).
72. 2001 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
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In this Section, I discuss the principles that I believe should
guide reform of the Social Security system.
A. Choice Must Be Made Between Collective Versus Individual
Responsibility
The most controversial question raised in the current Social
Security debate is whether the system's current structure should
be retained or fundamentally restructured to divert some payroll
taxes to individual accounts. This debate, in turn, raises the
fundamental question of the values that should undergird the
Social Security system: collective responsibility or individual
responsibility.
Under the collective responsibility, or collectivist, view, Social
Security is primarily a system of social insurance whose principal
goal is to pool risks, such as the risk of disability, leaving behind
dependents, and outliving one's assets.74 Under this approach
society works together to enhance security; we share "a common
social protection against the vicissitudes of life."75
Individual responsibility, in contrast, focuses on individual
freedom and "places the highest priority on individual freedom of
choice and control over one's own personal affairs."76 Central to
5E476B001DC7} (last visited Jul. 15, 2008). Democratic Senator Kent Conrad
and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham identified the following four
principles to guide legislative deliberations on the future of Social Security: (1)
Social Security must be preserved; (2) Social Security must be strengthened;
(3) Strengthening Social Security will require tough choices, and if done in a
responsible manner, can greatly improve our nation's fiscal outlook; and (4)
the costs of changing Social Security must be open and transparent. Kent
Conrad & Lindsey Graham, Editorial, How Social Security Reform Can
Become a Reality, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 2004, at 21A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-12-21-socialsecurity
_x.htm. Peter Diamond and Peter Orszag offered yet another set of goals to
guide Social Security reform: (1) restoring Social Security to a sound financial
footing; (2) reducing the future burden from Social Security on the rest of the
federal budget; (3) sharing the ongoing costs of the program's past generosity
in a fair manner; (4) preserving and strengthening the program's social
insurance functions; and (5) ensuring that, on balance, the changes enhance
the overall performance of the economy. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at
27.
74. See Julia Lynn Coronado and Paul A. Smith, Social Security At 70:
Principles, Issues and Alternatives, 58 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 505, 505 (Sept.
2005).
75. Hugh Heclo, A Political Science Perspective on Social Security Reform,
in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMICS 73 (1998) (R. Douglas Arnold et. al. eds.). See also Marmor &
Mashaw, supra note 70, at 126 ("Social insurance rests on the widespread
acceptance of the desirability of protecting workers and their families from
dramatic losses of economic status brought on by a common set of risks to
labor-market participation").
76. Heclo, supra note 75, at 73.
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the individualist approach is each individual's right to do what he
or she wishes with his or her resources unimpeded by
governmental intervention.
77
Collectivist principles point toward retaining the current
structure of the Social Security system. Individualist principles,
in contrast, argue for the fundamental restructuring of the system
to include individual accounts.
The role academics should play in influencing this choice is
subject to debate. According to one academic, "[a]cademics and
other experts have no special authority for telling other people
what choice should be made."7 8  On the other hand, many
academics and experts have forcefully argued for each of these
positions.7
9
In the past, I have offered my support for the collectivist
approach.80 I will not repeat my arguments here. I will, however,
note that the Federal Reserve Bank's recent bailout8 l of
77. See Haeworth Robertson, Social Security Reform Using Voluntary
Personal Accounts: Two former Social Security chief actuaries debate the
underlying principles behind partial privatization of the Social Security
program, CONTINGENCIES, May/June 2005, at 22, 24 (identifying individualist
principles).
78. Heclo, supra note 75, at 76.
79. For arguments in favor of personal accounts, see, e.g., Robertson, supra
note 77, at 24 (presenting individualist principles to argue in favor of
individual accounts); see also Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security
Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 145 (2004) (arguing in favor of restructuring
Social Security to include individual accounts to increase work incentives and
reduce work disincentives); see also Solomon & Barrow, supra note 69, at 17
(offering a number of arguments in favor of privatization of Social Security).
For arguments in favor of the current structure, see Marmor & Mashaw, supra
note 70, at 131 ("To some degree, the clash between individualistic and
collective visions of fairness frames the debate about risk bearing in the right
terms. And we believe that the social, political, and economic arguments that
have accounted for the durability of social insurance remain persuasive"); see
also DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 133 (arguing that individual
accounts "are simply inappropriate for a social insurance system intended to
provide for the basic tier of income during retirement, disability, and other
times of need"); see also HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER,
COUNTDOWN TO REFORM: THE GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 52 (1998)
("The argument that individuals should bear risk carries little weight in the
case of the basic pensions program. Rather than exposing workers individually
to these risks, it would be far better, we believe to spread them among active
and future workers and current beneficiaries.").
80. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, President Bush's Personal Retirement
Accounts: Saving or Dismantling Social Security, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ch.5, 5-23 to
5-24 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2005) (reflecting that collective action and solidarity
"lie at the heart of social insurance"); see generally Kathryn L. Moore,
Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131
(1998) (analyzing privatization proposals and their pitfalls).
81. See William Safire, Moral Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at 14
(discussing the moral hazard of bailing out Bear Stearns).
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investment bank Bear Stearns, a seemingly quintessential free
market player, shows that collectivist principles remain as
important today as they did when Social Security was founded at
the height of the Great Depression.8 2 In defending the Federal
Reserve's decision to give JPMorgan Chase a $29 billion line of
credit to encourage the purchase and rescue of Bear Stearns,
8 3
Timothy F. Geithner, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, said in testimony before Congress that failure to save
the investment bank would have led to "a greater probability of
widespread insolvencies, severe and protracted damage to the
financial system and, ultimately, to the economy as a whole."8 4 As
this article went to press in September 2008, the federal
government again chose collectivist principles over individualist
principles by taking over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac8 5 and the
American International Group86 and by asking Congress to enact
legislation that would authorize Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson to buy up to $700 billion in distressed mortgage-related
assets in private firms. 87 In pressing for the proposed plan,
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben S. Bernancke, warned
Senators that failure to approve the plan would be "a major drag
on the U.S. economy and greatly impede the ability of the economy
to recover."
88
82. Arguably, the economy today is in the worst shape it has been since the
Great Depression. Cf. Robert J. Shiller, The Fed Gets a New Job Description,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at 5 ("It has been said that Ben S. Bernanke chose
an awful time to become chairman of the Federal Reserve - in February 2006,
just as the economy was about to enter its worst financial crisis since the
1930s").
83. Id.
84. Stephen Labaton, Bear Stearns in the Committee Room, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2008, at C1.
85 For a discussion of the Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac takeover, see In
Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y.
TIMES, September 8, 2008, at Al.
86. For a discussion of the bailout of the insurance giant, American
International Group, see Edmund L. Andrews, et al., Fed in an $85 Billion
Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.
87. For a discussion of the Bush Administration's proposed plan, see David
Herszenhorn, Administration is Seeking $700 Billion Dollars for Wall Street in
Possible Record Bailout, New York Times, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al
88 Mark Landler and David M. Herszenhorn, White House Pushes Plan;
Congress Objects: Lawmakers Challenge Lack of Help Aimed at Homemakers,
,Sept. 24, 2008, at Al
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B. Reform Must Address Social Security's Financing Difficulties
Currently, the Social Security system collects more in payroll
taxes than it pays in benefits. For example, in 2007, the Trust
Funds collected $656.1 billion in payroll taxes and only paid out
$584.9 billion in benefits, resulting in a surplus of $71.2 billion.8 9
Indeed, at the beginning of 2008, the Social Security Trust Funds
held $2.2 trillion in assets, and the assets are expected to grow to
$4.3 trillion by the beginning of 2017.90
Nevertheless, Social Security faces a long-term deficit. Due
principally to the retirement of the baby boom generation, Social
Security's costs are expected to increase more rapidly than its
payroll tax revenue between 2010 and 2030.91 After 2030,
increases in life expectancy as well as the fact that the baby boom
generation is followed by a much smaller generation are expected
to cause costs to increase relative to payroll tax revenue, but more
slowly.92 In light of these demographic changes, the Board of
Trustees projects that by 2017, the Social Security system will
begin to collect less in contributions than it owes in benefits, and
by 2041, the Trust Fund will be exhausted.93 At that point in
time, absent an intervening change in the law, the system will
only be able to pay seventy-eight percent of promised benefits, and
by 2080, the system will only be able to pay seventy-five percent of
promised annual benefits. 94
Traditionally, the Social Security actuaries have used a
seventy-five year horizon for measuring Social Security's long-
term balance. 95 The key traditional criterion for evaluating Social
89. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORt, supra note 21, at 4 tbl.II.B1. In 2007,
the Trust Funds collected a total of $784.9 billion dollars, of which $656.1
billion dollars was attributable to payroll taxes, $18.6 billion dollars was
attributable to income taxation imposed on benefits received by high income
beneficiaries, and $110.2 billion dollars was income from interest on the Trust
Funds' surplus. Id. The Trust Funds' total expenditures were $594.5 billion
dollars ($584.9 billion dollars for benefit payments, 4 billion dollars for the
Railroad Retirement financial interchange, and $5.5 billion dollars for
administrative expenses). Id. Thus, at the end of the year, there was a total
annual surplus of $190.4 billion dollars. Id.
90. These figures refer to the combined assets of the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds. 2008 BD. OF
TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 2. All figures referred to in this section




94. Id. at 18.
95. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 32. The Social Security actuaries
have used the seventy-five year horizon consistently since 1965. Id. Before
1965, the valuation periods ranged from as short as thirty-five years to as long
as eighty years. See Altman, supra note 55, at 16 n.18.
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Security's financing is its seventy-five year actuarial balance,96
that is, the difference between the program's income and cost
expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll over seventy-five
years. 97 According to the Board of Trustee's 2008 Report, Social
Security's current seventy-five year actuarial balance is -1.70% of
taxable payroll. 98 This means that an immediate increase of 1.70
percentage points in payroll tax rates (from the current level of
12.4% for employers and employees combined to 14.1%) would
restore solvency to the Social Security system over the seventy-five
year horizon. 99 "[R]eporting the imbalance in this way is not
meant to recommend that the payroll tax rate be raised by this
amount. Rather, it is a way of summarizing the magnitude of the
financial difficulties at hand."100 The Trustees' Report also offers a
couple of other ways to illustrate the deficit. For example, the
Report identifies the cumulative value of the system's income less
cost, in present value, over seventy-five years.10 1  Specifically,
through the end of 2082, Social Security has a present-value
unfunded obligation of $4.3 trillion, which represents 0.6% of
future GDP.102
Social Security must be reformed to address this long-term
deficit. 103 While that task may appear daunting, it is important to
put it in perspective. First, while not insignificant, Social
Security's long-term deficit is much more manageable than that of
Medicare. Specifically, Social Security's seventy-five year
actuarial deficit of 1.70% of taxable payroll is less than half of
Medicare's seventy-five year deficit of 3.54% of taxable payroll.10 4
96. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 30.
97. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 10.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id. at 18.
100. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 30. The Trustees' Report also
states that solvency over the seventy-five year horizon could be restored by
reducing all current and future benefits by 11.5%. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES'
REPORT, supra note 21, at 18. Similarly, this is not a recommendation for a
benefit reduction.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id.
103. Solving Social Security's seventy-five-year actuarial imbalance would
not completely eliminate Social Security's financing difficulties. Over the
infinite horizon, Social Security's unfunded liability is projected to be $13.6
trillion dollars in present value or 3.2% of future taxable payroll or 1.1% of
future GDP. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 13. That does
not mean, however, that reform efforts must focus on solving the deficit over
the infinite horizon. Such projections are necessarily imprecise and can make
it easier to employ gimmicks to achieve balance. See DIAMOND & ORSZAG,
supra note 8, at 32-33 (arguing longer projection horizons are beneficial but
should not play a central role in current reform efforts).
104. 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL
HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS 3 (using intermediate assumptions).
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Moreover, while Social Security's unfunded obligation of $4.3
trillion over the seventy-five horizon is hardly trivial, estimates for
the long term cost of the Iraq war range from $1 trillion to more
than $4 trillion,105 and "the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, if continued
over the next seventy-five years, would reduce revenue by about
$12 trillion in present value, or roughly three times Social
Security's actuarial imbalance over the same period."'
106
C. Effective Reform Requires Increased Revenues, Reduced
Benefits, or Some Combination of the Two
There is no magic rabbit or costless way to resolve Social
Security's long-term deficit. 10 7 Proponents of individual accounts
may have other justifications for fundamentally restructuring the
system, but solving the system's long-term deficit is not a reason
to introduce individual accounts. 08 Restoring Social Security's
solvency requires that the system's revenues be increased, benefits
reduced, or some combination of increased revenues and reduced
benefits.109
Revenue increases could take a variety of forms. For
example, the taxable wage base could be increased. Under current
law, both employers 10 and employees" 1 must pay a tax of 6.2% of
wages up to a maximum taxable wage base 1 2 that is indexed for
105. David M. Herszenhorn, Estimates of Iraq War Cost Were Not Close to
Ballpark, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A9 (reporting that estimates of the
cost of the Iraq war after five years range from $600 billion to four trillion).
106. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 31. Cf. Richard Kogan & Robert
Greenstein, President Portrays Social Security Shortfall as Enormous But His
Tax Cuts and Drug Benefit Will Cost at Least Five Times as Much, 2005 CTR.
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1 (estimating the cost of making the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts permanent at 1.95% of GDP or $11.1 trillion dollars).
107. John Laitner, Soc. Sec. Solvency: A Crisis?, 2005 UNIV. OF MICH. RET.
RESEARCH CTR. POLICY BRIEF No.1, at 3 ("[T]here is no panacea for Social
Security's looming solvency problems: we need to find new revenues, reduce
benefits, or both.").
108. Virginia P. Reno & Joni Lavery, Options to Balance Social Security
Funds Over the Next 75 Years, 2005 NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. No.18, at 3
("Proposals to set up individual private, or personal, accounts as part of Social
Security ... by themselves, make no independent contribution to the long-
term solvency of Social Security.").
109. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: THE NATURE
OF THE PROBLEM, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 11 (Sept. 2007) ("Social Security can be
made permanently solvent only by reducing the present value of scheduled
benefits and/or increasing the present value of tax revenues. Other changes to
the program might be desirable, but only these changes can restore solvency
permanently."). See also Reno & Lavery, supra note 108, at 3 ("To balance
Social Security finances over the next 75 years will require either raising
revenue, cutting benefits, or a combination of both steps.").
110. 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a) (2006).
111. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (2006).
112. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 430(a) (2006).
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increases in the national average wage. In 2008, the maximum
taxable wage base is $102,000,113 and covers about eighty-four
percent of total payroll. 114 The maximum taxable wage base could
gradually be increased until it reaches eighty-seven percent or
ninety percent of taxable payroll as some commentators have
suggested. 115 In the alternative, the taxable wage base could
simply be increased to a higher amount, such as $250,000, or
totally eliminated and all wages could be subject to the payroll
tax.116
Another way to increase revenues is to increase the payroll
tax rate. The current payroll tax rate is 6.2% for both employers
and employees. If the payroll tax rate on both employers and
employees were immediately increased by 0.85%, for a total
increase of 1.70%, Social Security's seventy-five year deficit would
be eliminated. 117 Revenues could also be raised by increasing the
payroll tax rate by a lesser amount or by scheduling a tax rate
increase to take effect in the future when Social Security is
projected to have a cash flow deficit. 118
Revenues could also be increased by extending coverage to
state and local employees. Currently, the Social Security system
only covers about seventy-five percent of all state and local
employees; 119 about four million state and local government
employees are not covered by the Social Security system.120 A
number of analysts and advisory groups have recommended that
coverage be extended to include newly hired state and local
employees. 121
113. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 133.
114. According to the most recent statistical supplement to the Social
Security bulletin, the maximum taxable wage base covered 83.6% of total
covered earnings in 2006. 2007 SSA STAT. SUPP., supra note 27, at 4.13
tbl.4.B1.
115. See, e.g., ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 301-02 (endorsing Robert Ball's
proposal to gradually increase taxable wage base until it covers ninety percent
of covered earnings); see also DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 85-86
(recommending that taxable wage base gradually be increased until it covers
eighty-seven percent of covered earnings).
116. For an analysis of the effect of such changes on Social Security's long-
term deficit, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTED EFFECTS OF VARIOUS
PROVISIONS ON SOCIAL SECURITY'S FINANCIAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
OUTCOMES tbl.1 § 5 (May 25, 2005).
117. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 18.
118. For discussion of these proposed changes and their effect on Social
Security's solvency, see Reno & Lavery, supra note 108 at 8; CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at tbl. 1 § 5.1
119. ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 306.
120. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 90.
121. See, e.g., ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 306-07; DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra
note 8, at 90-92; ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8, at 19-20; U.S.
NAT'L COMM. ON RETIREMENT POLICY, THE 21ST CENTURY RETIREMENT
SECURITY PLAN: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
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Another way to increase Social Security's revenues is to
transfer general revenues to the system or earmark other taxes for
Social Security. For example, Robert Ball has proposed
earmarking the estate tax for Social Security.122 Under current
law, the estate tax exemption is scheduled to gradually increase
from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million in 2009, be abolished in
2010, and revived at its 2000 level beginning in 2011.123 Ball has
proposed that the estate tax be frozen at its 2009 level and the
proceeds be earmarked for Social Security.124
Just as revenues may be increased in a variety of ways, there
are a multitude of ways to decrease benefits. Perhaps the most
straightforward, though not necessarily best, method of reducing
benefits would be to impose an across-the-board reduction in
benefits. For example, benefits could be reduced by three percent
or five percent for all new beneficiaries beginning in 2010.125
Benefits could also be reduced by increasing the normal
retirement age. Under current law, a retired worker is entitled to
receive "full" benefits at her normal retirement age (NRA).126 The
NRA is sixty-five for workers who reached sixty-two before 2000
and is scheduled to increase gradually to sixty-seven by 2022.127 If
a worker retires before the NRA, her benefits are actuarially
reduced to reflect the earlier collection of benefits. 128  Thus,
increasing the NRA is almost economically identical to an across-
the-board reduction in benefits for retirees. 129 In recent years, a
number of policymakers and commentators have recommended
that the currently scheduled increase in the NRA be accelerated
and/or that the NRA be increased further.
130
RETIREMENT POLICY 35 (1999).
122. ROBERT M. BALL, THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROTECTION PLAN: How WE
CAN COPE - CALMLY - WITH THE SYSTEM'S LONG-TERM SHORTFALL 2-3 (Jan.
2006).
123. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
107-16, 115 Stat. 69-72 (2001).
124. BALL, supra note 122, at 2-3; see also ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 299-
301 (endorsing Ball's proposal).
125. If a benefit reduction of three percent for newly eligible beneficiaries
were introduced in 2005, twenty percent of Social Security's long-term deficit
would have been solved. Reno & Lavery, supra note 108, at 6. A five percent
reduction would have solved thirty-two percent of the long-term deficit. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 4160) (2006).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (2006).
129. Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages:
Weighing the Costs and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 562-63 (2001).
130. See Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform: Fundamental
Restructuring or Incremental Change, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 341, 380-81,
n.273 (2007) (collecting authorities that advocate further increases in the
normal retirement age).
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Another way to reduce benefits is to change the benefit
formula. For workers reaching age sixty-two in 2008, the Social
Security benefit formula replaces ninety percent of the first $711
of AIME, plus thirty-two percent of AIME between $711 and
$4,288, plus fifteen percent of AIME above $4,288.13' Benefits
could be reduced by reducing one or more of these factors. For
example, all of the factors could be reduced by twenty percent, or
the top two factors could be reduced from thirty-two percent to
twenty percent and from fifteen percent to ten percent,
respectively, or the top factor could be reduced from fifteen to ten
percent.
1 32
A third method of reducing benefits is to change Social
Security's cost of living adjustments. Under current law, once
initial Social Security benefits are calculated, they are then
adjusted for increases in the cost of living. 133 Benefits could be
reduced by reducing the annual cost-of-living increase by some set
amount, such as one percentage point or by a half a percentage
point. 3 4 In the alternative, a new cost of living measure could be
used. Currently, benefits are indexed to changes in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers
(CPI-W). 135 Some analysts have argued that this measure should
be replaced with a new "chained" CPI that takes into account the
fact that individuals substitute purchases and change their
spending habits as prices rise. 136 Cost-of-living adjustments are
expected to be slightly lower under the chained CPI than under
the current CPI-W.
137
Of course, any revenue increase or benefit reduction has its
own set of advantages and disadvantages. My purpose here is not
to provide an analysis of the costs and benefits of each possible
type of reform, 138 or even an exhaustive list of the possible types of
131. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 104 fig.V.C1.
132. According to the Congressional Budget Office, all three of these
proposed changes would restore the Social Security system to solvency.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at tbl.1 § 2.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (2006).
134. See Reno & Lavery, supra note 108, at 7 (comparing the impact of
various cost of living changes on Social Security's solvency); see also
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 42, at tbl.1, § 4 (analyzing the
solvency effects of other changes to the cost-of-living adjustment).
135. Reno & Lavery, supra note 108, at 7.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. For an analysis of the costs and benefits of some of the reform
proposals, see Moore, supra note 130; Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security
Reform: An Analysis of the Ball/Altman Three-Point Plan, in NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
ch.22 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2007) [hereinafter Moore's Analysis of the
Ball/Altman Plan]; Moore, supra note 129.
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reform. 139 Instead, it is simply to identify some of the myriad ways
in which revenues can be increased or benefits reduced.
D. Sooner is Better than Later
Although the Social Security system is currently running a
surplus, most policymakers and analysts agree that the system's
long-term deficit should be addressed sooner rather than later.
140
Acting sooner rather than later provides a number of advantages.
First, it allows for a wider array of possible reforms. 141 As
discussed in the preceding section, there are a multitude of reform
options currently available. Delay reduces the range of available
options. For example, as discussed above, the normal retirement
age is currently scheduled to gradually increase to age sixty-seven.
Specifically, under current law, beginning in 2017, the normal
retirement age is scheduled to increase two months each year until
it reaches age sixty-seven for workers who reach sixty-two in 2022
and after.142 The longer reform is delayed, the less viable the
option of accelerating the currently scheduled increase becomes.
Second, the sooner change is implemented, the less severe it
needs to be. To illustrate, solvency over the seventy-five year
horizon could be restored by immediately increasing payroll taxes
from the current level of 12.4% to 14.10%.143 If no action is taken
until the trust funds become exhausted, then the payroll taxes
would have to be increased to 15.94% in 2041 and continue rising
to 16.60% in 2082.144 Alternatively, if benefits were immediately
139. For additional studies of the range of options, see generally Reno &
Lavery, supra note 108, at 3-9; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note
42 at tbl.1 ; SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY: WHY
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN SOON 27-37 (Sept. 2005); Craig Copeland,
Comparing Social Security Reform Options, 2005 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 281.
140. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 139, at 20
(discussing the advantages of early action to reform Social Security);
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (endorsing early reform action
because it allows for more choices); GAO ANSWERS, supra note 38, at 31
(explaining that we cannot "wait for a more immediate solvency crisis" to
reform Social Security because early action allows for more "budgetary
flexibility"); Brown et al., supra note 11, at 338 ("While analysts may disagree
over the most appropriate method of any reform, there should be little
disagreement that the system is in need of reform and that acting soon to
address the problem is preferable to doing nothing"). But see Neil H.
Buchanan, Social Security and Government Deficits: When Should We Worry,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 257 (2007) (arguing that there is no need to act now to
reform Social Security).
141. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 139, at 20 ("There
are more choices available earlier); ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 8,
at 16 ("[E]arly action also ensures that the widest possible array of options is
available to policymakers.").
142. 42 U.S.C. § 416(1)(3)(B) (2006).
143. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 18.
144. Id.
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reduced by about 11.5%, solvency would be restored to the
system. 145 Delaying reform until exhaustion of the trust funds
would require that benefits be reduced by twenty-two percent in
2041 and reductions continue until they reached twenty-five
percent in 2082.146
Third, the sooner reform is carried out, the more widely the
burden can be shared.1 47 For example, if the maximum taxable
wage base is immediately increased, then all current and future
high-wage workers will have to bear the burden of this increased
tax. If implementation of the change is delayed, then only future
high wage workers will have to bear the burden. Earlier
implementation allows the burden of change to be shared more
evenly across generations.
148
Fourth, earlier implementation allows for changes to be
phased in more gradually 149 and thus ensure that successive
generations are treated relatively equally. 150 The risk of abrupt
change can be seen in the "notch baby" problem that arose when
Congress modified Social Security's inflation adjustment formula
in the late 1970s. In 1972, Congress passed legislation that
provided for the automatic indexation of Social Security beginning
in 1975.151 Unfortunately, the formula did not work in light of the
high inflation experienced at the time. 152 Accordingly, Congress
amended the formula, but only applied the new formula to
individuals who reached retirement age after 1977,153 The change
in formula resulted in individuals reaching retirement age just
after 1977 receiving benefits that were, on average, ten percent
lower than those of individuals reaching retirement age the
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 3 ("Making adjustments sooner will allow them to be spread
over more generations").
148. SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 139, at 20 ("The net
effect of delaying action is to reduce or eliminate the burden of repairing Social
Security on earlier generations and to place an even heavier burden on later
generations.").
149. 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 ("The projected
trust deficits should be addressed in a timely way to allow for a gradual
phasing in of the necessary changes."); SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD,
supra note 139, at 20 ("Changes can be phased in more gradually."); GAO
ANSWERS, supra note 38, at 31 ("Acting soon would allow changes to be
smaller and to be phased in so the individuals who are most likely to be
affected, namely younger and future workers, will have more time to adjust
their retirement planning.").
150. SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 139, at 20 ("Making
gradual changes avoids creation of the large differences in benefit or tax levels
between successive generations of retirees and workers that result when
modifications are made precipitously.").
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preceding year.154 These "notch babies" felt shortchanged by the
differential and vehemently protested the change. 155 Members of
Congress introduced 113 bills to "correct" the situation, although,
Congress ultimately chose not to change the differential
treatment. 1
56
Finally, 57 earlier and more gradual implementation provides
workers with advance notice of impending changes so they are
better able to prepare and respond to changes.15 8 For example, if
benefits are to be reduced, the sooner workers know, the more
easily they will be able to make career and investment choices to
make up for the loss in Social Security benefits.
E. Burden of Reform Should Be Widely Shared
In theory, Social Security's entire seventy-five year actuarial
deficit could be resolved by immediately eliminating the taxable
wage base for purposes of determining earnings subject to payroll
taxes but not for purposes of crediting earnings in determining
benefits. 159 I would not, however, recommend such a change for a
number of reasons.1 60 First, it would violate one of the nine
principles underlying the current Social Security system, that
benefits be related to wages. 161 Second, such an abrupt and
significant change would not give affected workers affected ample
to time to prepare for such a change. Third, immediately
eliminating the taxable wage base could, at least arguably, have
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 83-84.
157. The Social Security Advisory Board identifies three other reasons for
prompt action: (1) confidence in the ability of Social Security to continue to pay
benefits to future generations of retirees will be strengthened; (2) there will be
less disruption in labor market participation; and (3) there will be less
disruption in decisions about consumption and savings. SOCIAL SECURITY
ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 139, at 20-2 1.
158. SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 139, at 20 ("There will
be more advance notice for those who will be affected, so they can plan for
their retirement.").
159. Indeed, such a change would result in a positive actuarial balance of
0.25% of taxable payroll. See Memorandum from Alice H. Wade, Deputy Chief
Actuary, & Chris Chaplain, Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., to Steve C. Goss, Chief
Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., Estimated Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of
Eliminating the OASDI Contribution and Benefit Base 3 (Oct. 20, 2003) (using
the intermediate assumption of the 2003 Social Security Trustees' Report).
160. I do support gradually increasing the taxable wage base until it reaches
eighty-seven percent or ninety percent of covered earnings. Moore, supra note
130, at 377-78.
161. See supra Part II-A-3 (discussing Ball's third principal that benefits be
tied to wages). See also Reno & Lavery, supra note 108, at 3 ("Ever since
Social Security began, the level of wages that are taxed has been linked to the
level of wages that count toward benefits. This proposal would break that
link.").
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an adverse impact on work effort by increasing the marginal tax
rate of labor.
Finally, and most importantly, immediately eliminating the
taxable wage base for tax but not benefit purposes would impose
the entire burden of reform on a single subpopulation, the five or
six percent of workers whose wages exceed the taxable wage
base. 16 2 Requiring such a small subpopulation of covered workers
to bear the entire brunt of reform is neither fair nor politically
wise. Just as Social Security should be amended sooner rather
than later, so that the cost of reform may be shared more evenly
among generations, I believe that the cost of reform should be
shared within generations as well.
163
This is not to suggest that the burden of reform should be
shared exactly equally within generations. I support the current
system's progressive benefit structure. Nevertheless, I do not
believe that the entire cost of reform should be imposed on a very
small segment of Social Security beneficiaries or contributors.
F. Social Security's Safety Net Should Be Retained
When discussing Social Security reform, policymakers and
commentators often discuss the effect particular reform options
would have on the federal budget and the economy at large.
1 64
While these effects are not irrelevant, we must not lose sight of the
fact that "[t]he essential objective of government pension policy is
to provide a financially secure shelter to older Americans who are
no longer working." 165  Stated another way, the fundamental
purpose of Social Security is to provide workers and their
dependents with a safety net in the event of old-age, disability, or
death.166
162. Whitman, supra note 22, at CRS-3 tbl.1.
163. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, ISSUE BRIEF No. 27 (Oct. 2007) ("Once a decision
is made as to how the Social Security reform burden should be distributed
across reform cohorts, the natural next question is how the burden should be
distributed within birth cohorts.").
164. See, e.g., DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 8, at 45 ("A final set of
objectives for Social Security reform is to improve overall performance of the
American economy."); GAO ANSWERS, supra note 38, at 34 (identifying "the
extent to which a proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how it would
affect the economy and the federal budget" as one of the three basic criteria
that should be used to evaluate Social Security reform options); Edward M.
Gramlich, The Goals of Social Security Reform, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229,
1230 (2001) (contending that one of the two goals for Social Security reform
should be to raise national savings). See also SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY
BOARD, supra note 136, at 39 (describing the issue of how reform would affect
the economy as among the questions that are likely to be raised in discussions
about the future of Social Security).
165. Heclo, supra note 75, at 70.
166. See AARON & REISCHAUER, supra note 79, at 51 (describing Social
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In December 2006, almost fifty million individuals received
Social Security benefits. 167 Sixty-nine percent of the beneficiaries
were retired workers and their dependents, thirteen percent were
survivors of deceased workers, and eighteen percent were disabled
workers and their spouses and dependent children. 168 The benefits
were not overly generous; 169 the average monthly benefits were
$1,044 (or $12,528 per year) for retired workers, $978 (or $11,736
annually) for disabled workers, and $1,008 (or $12,096 annually)
for nondisabled widows and widowers. 170
Despite their relatively modest size, Social Security benefits
played a very important role in providing income security for many
beneficiaries. Specifically, for sixty-six percent of beneficiaries,
Social Security was the major source of income (providing fifty
percent or more of total income).171 For one-third of beneficiaries,
Social Security contributed ninety percent or more of their income,
and it was the only source of income for twenty-one percent of
beneficiaries.1 72 Indeed, Social Security has done an outstanding
job of lifting the elderly out of poverty. Currently, about ten
percent of the population aged sixty-five or older has an income
below the poverty line.173 Without Social Security, that figure
would rise to almost fifty percent.
1 74
Social Security's role of providing a minimum level of income
protection for retired and disabled workers and their dependents
should be retained.
Security as a "program that is intended to assure basic income during
retirement, disability, and survivorship").
167. 2007 SSA STAT. SUPP., supra note 27, at 2.
168. Id.
169. The weighted average poverty threshold in 2006 for an individual aged
sixty-five or older was $9,669. Id. at 8.
170. Id. at 2.
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 8.
174. See Arloc Sherman & Isaac Shapiro, Social Security Lifts 13 Million
Seniors Above the Poverty Line: A State-by-State Analysis, 2005 CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1 available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-24-
05socsec-pr.pdf ("Leaving aside Social Security income, nearly one of every two
elderly people--46.8%--has income below the poverty line.").
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G. Reform Will Require True Bipartisan Effort
The last time Congress significantly amended Social Security
was in 1983.175 At that the time, Social Security faced both a
short-term funding crisis as well as a long-term deficit. 176 On
December 16, 1981, President Reagan appointed a bipartisan
commission, the National Commission on Social Security Reform,
to study the short and long-term financial conditions of the
system.177  President Reagan charged the Commission with
reporting its findings and recommendations to the President and
Congress. 178 On January 20, 1983, the Commission reported its
findings and recommendations, 1 79 and three months later
President Reagan signed the Social Security Amendments Act of
1983 into law. 180  That law substantially embodied the
recommendations of the Commission.18 President Reagan praised
the law as "a tribute to bipartisan action" and "a monument to the
spirit of the compassion and commitment that unites us as a
people.... Each of us had to... give up a little in order to get a
lot." 8
2
Comprehensive reform of Social Security will not be achieved
again until there is a true joint effort to address Social Security's
long-term deficit. In recent years, there have been so-called
bipartisan efforts to reform Social Security. For example, on May
2, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the appointment of
a sixteen-member bipartisan "Commission to Strengthen Social
Security."'' 3 The Commission issued a 135 page report outlining
three different models for reforming Social Security in December
175. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(1983).
176. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983:
Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN, July 1983, at 3.
177. Exec. Order No. 12,335, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,633 (Dec. 18, 1981).
178. Id.
179. GREENSPAN COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (1983). For a fascinating insider's account of the
compromises and negotiations involved in reaching the final agreement, see
ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 237-53.
180. Social Security Amendments of 1983.
181. See Svahn & Ross, supra note 176, at 4-5 (describing the provisions of
the law as enacted and how they differed from the Commission's
recommendations).
182. See id. at 3 (quoting President Reagan).
183. Exec. Order No. 13,210, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,895 (May 2, 2001). See also
Remarks on Establishing the President's Commission To Strengthen Social
Security, 1 PUB. PAPERS 477 (May 2, 2001), available at http://
www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/pcsss/potus.html (reporting President
Bush's remarks at the announcement of the commission).
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2001.184 The Commission's report received extensive
commentary 18 5 but did not lead to legislative change. The reason
it failed to produce real change is because members of the
Commission did not represent a fair cross section of American
opinion. Instead, membership was limited to individuals who
were committed to the President's principles, which included no
increase in Social Security payroll taxes, no government
investment of Social Security funds in the stock market, and the
inclusion of individually controlled, voluntary personal retirement
accounts.186
Effective Social Security reform will require a true joint effort.
As Democratic Senator Conrad and Republican Senator Lindsey
Graham have said, "[a] solution must be bipartisan; presidential
leadership will be needed; rigid ideology must give way to
workable solutions; and reasonable sacrifice will be required."187
IV. CONCLUSION
Reform of the Social Security system is inevitable. The only
questions are how and when. In this article, I have offered seven
principles to guide reform.
The principles call on Congress and the Administration to
come together soon to make the hard choices necessary to bring
Social Security into actuarial-or at least close actuarial1 8-
balance over the next seventy-five years. The principles offer
considerable flexibility in the final details of reform. They would
retain Social Security's fundamental structure but gradually
introduce changes on both the revenue and benefit side so as to
distribute the burden of reform widely across generations and
within generations.
A reform package based on these principles might include: (1)
a gradual increase in the taxable wage base until it reaches
184. 2001 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5.
185. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-310, SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM: ANALYSIS OF REFORM MODELS DEVELOPED BY THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL SECURITY (2003)
(examining the reforms proposed by the 2001 President's Commission); see
also PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, REDUCING BENEFITS AND
SUBSIDIZING INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLANS PROPOSED
BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL SECURITY (2002)
(analyzing the three reform models proposed by the 2001 President's
Commission).
186. 2001 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
187. Conrad & Graham, supra note 73, at 21A.
188. Close actuarial balance requires that income be within plus-or-minus
five percent of outgo over the next seventy-five years. The trustees have used
this test to determine whether to recommend legislative changes since 1957.
ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 297.
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eighty-seven or ninety percent of taxable payroll; 8 9 (2) freezing the
estate tax at 2009 levels and dedicating it to Social Security; 190
and (3) a gradual increase in the normal retirement age beyond
that which is already scheduled under current law.191 A reform
package based on these principles would not include individual
accounts or progressive price indexing because such changes would
fundamentally restructure the Social Security system and risk
dismantling the entire system.
192
189. For an analysis of the costs and benefits of gradually increasing the
taxable wage base, see Moore, supra note 138, at 22-7 to 22-11.
190. For an analysis of the costs and benefits of freezing the estate tax and
dedicating it to Social Security, see Moore, supra note 130, at 360-68.
191. For an analysis of the costs and benefits of increasing the normal
retirement age, see Moore, supra note 129.
192. See Moore, supra note 130, at 353-55; see Moore, supra note 80, at 5-22
to 5-25.
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